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Ellingburg v. United States — United States Supreme Court Confirms Restitution Is Criminal Punishment

Thu, 05 Feb 2026 21:33:00 GMT

Case: Holsey Ellingburg, Jr. v. United States , No. 24‑482
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Link to opinion: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5239769988921014071&q=Ellingburg+v.+United+States

United States Supreme Court Rules: Restitution Under the MVRA Is Criminal Punishment

In a unanimous ruling , the United States Supreme Court held that restitution imposed under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) is a form of criminal punishment , not a civil remedy. The case, Ellingburg v. United States, has major implications for how courts may impose restitution—especially in older cases.

The MVRA requires defendants convicted of certain federal offenses to compensate victims for their losses. Although intended to punish offenders and support victims, restitution often becomes long‑term debt that lingers for decades and rarely results in meaningful compensation.

The Court’s opinion brings clarity to how restitution must be treated under the Ex Post Facto Clause and reinforces important Constitutional protections for criminal defendants.

Background: Restitution Applied Retroactively

Holsey Ellingburg committed his offense before the MVRA was enacted. However, when he was later sentenced, the court applied the newer statute and ordered him to pay $7,567.25 in restitution.

Because interest accrued over decades—long after his conviction—his financial obligation nearly doubled. This left him with a crushing debt he could not realistically pay, despite having long completed his sentence.

The Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether applying MVRA restitution retroactively violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Why the Court Ruled Restitution Is Criminal Punishment

The Court unanimously concluded that restitution under the MVRA is plainly punitive , and therefore constitutes criminal punishment .

Key Reasons:

The MVRA labels restitution as a “penalty” imposed for a criminal “offense” (18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1)).
Only a criminal defendant convicted of a qualifying crime may receive a restitution order.
The consequences—accumulated interest, extended payment schedules, and lifelong debt—are punitive in nature.

Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the Court, emphasized that because restitution is punishment, it must abide by the same constitutional limits that apply to incarceration or fines.

Ex Post Facto Implications: Government Cannot Move the Goalposts

This ruling has significant implications for:

➡️ Individuals with Old Federal Convictions

People whose restitution ballooned due to interest or retroactive application of MVRA rules may now have grounds for relief.

➡️ Crime Victims

Victims are protected from false hope created by unpayable restitution debt that defendants will never realistically satisfy.

➡️ The Justice System

Courts must now clearly distinguish between criminal and civil penalties when applying restitution statutes.

If you or a loved one are dealing with federal restitution, sentencing, or post‑conviction concerns, you need experienced legal guidance.

Contact the Law Offices of Gritz, Hanifin & Shih, LLC today for a free consultation.
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Facing Federal Criminal or Restitution Issues? We Can Help.

1. What did the Supreme Court decide in Ellingburg v. United States?

The Court ruled unanimously that restitution under the MVRA is criminal punishment, not a civil remedy. This means restitution must follow the same constitutional rules as other criminal penalties.

2. Why does it matter whether restitution is considered criminal punishment?

Because criminal penalties cannot be applied retroactively, the government cannot impose restitution terms that were not in place when the offense was committed.

3. Can interest or penalties be added to old restitution orders?

Under this ruling, no. Retroactively increasing interest or extending payments violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.

4. What happened to Mr. Ellingburg’s restitution debt?

His restitution debt had nearly doubled due to decades of interest—an example the Court used to show how restitution can become excessively punitive without constitutional limits.

5. Does this mean restitution will go away?

No. Restitution remains mandatory in qualifying cases. The ruling simply restricts courts from applying new laws to old offenses.

6. What should I do if my restitution increased years after sentencing?

You may have legal grounds to challenge it. Speak with a federal criminal defense attorney immediately.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Maryland Supreme Court: Touching a Phone While Driving Is Not Enough for a Traffic Stop

Wed, 04 Feb 2026 12:56:00 GMT

State of Maryland v. Michael Eugene Stone , No. 16, September Term 2025
Opinion Date: January 27, 2026
Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court of Maryland has reaffirmed critical Fourth Amendment protections, ruling that merely touching or manipulating a phone while driving—without more—does not create reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. The decision significantly impacts Maryland’s distracted‑driving enforcement and sets a clear constitutional boundary for police stops.

Background: Traffic Stop Leads to Drug Charges

Police officers in Hagerstown, Maryland stopped Mr. Stone after observing him manipulating or pressing the screen of a cellphone mounted to his windshield while the car was in motion. Officers provided no further details about texting, swiping, or any specific illegal activity.

Although Stone was not charged with a mobile‑phone violation, officers searched his vehicle and recovered fentanyl, resulting in drug‑related charges. Stone moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the stop itself was unconstitutional.

Relevant statutes included:

Transportation Article § 21‑1124
Transportation Article § 21‑1124.1
Transportation Article § 21‑1124.2

These govern texting and other prohibited uses of handheld devices while driving.

Trial Court: Phone Manipulation Alone Creates Suspicion

The Circuit Court for Washington County denied the suppression motion, reasoning that because the observed conduct could have been texting, it created reasonable articulable suspicion for a traffic stop. Stone was later convicted of fentanyl possession at trial.

Appellate Court: Innocent Conduct Is Not Enough

The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the conviction, finding that:

Touching or manipulating a mounted phone is innocent conduct .
Officers articulated no facts suggesting illegal device use.
Observing ambiguous behavior cannot justify a stop under Maryland’s distracted‑driving statutes.

Supreme Court of Maryland: Ambiguous Phone Use Cannot Justify a Stop

The Supreme Court affirmed .
According to the Court, when conduct is equally consistent with lawful and unlawful phone use , the Fourth Amendment requires specific, articulable facts suggesting illegality.
Just observing someone touch a mounted phone:

does not eliminate a “substantial portion of innocent drivers,”
does not provide reasonable suspicion,
cannot justify a traffic stop.

Therefore, the stop was unconstitutional, and the evidence obtained during the search was properly suppressed .

What This Means for Maryland Drivers

This ruling clarifies:

Police need more than speculation.
Changing music, using GPS, adjusting a mounted device—these are lawful and common.
Distracted‑driving enforcement must be evidence‑based.
Ambiguous conduct alone cannot trigger a traffic stop.
Evidence from unconstitutional stops can be thrown out.
For Stone, this meant the drug evidence was suppressed and his conviction reversed.

Facing Criminal or Traffic Charges? We Can Help.

If you’ve been stopped—or searched—based on questionable or minimal suspicion, you may have strong grounds to challenge the evidence. Our firm aggressively defends your constitutional rights.

Contact the Law Offices of Gritz, Hanifin & Shih, LLC today for a free consultation.
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Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Can police stop me for touching my phone while driving in Maryland?
No. The Maryland Supreme Court ruled that merely touching or pressing a mounted phone—without more—is not enough to justify a traffic stop.
What do Maryland’s distracted driving laws prohibit?
Under TR §§ 21‑1124, 21‑1124.1, and 21‑1124.2, texting and certain handheld uses are prohibited. But drivers may still use GPS, initiate or end calls, or call 911.
What counts as reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop?
Police must articulate specific facts that reasonably suggest illegal conduct—not behavior equally consistent with lawful actions.
What happens if a stop is unconstitutional?
Any evidence obtained during the unlawful stop or search may be suppressed , meaning it cannot be used in court.
Does this ruling weaken distracted‑driving enforcement?
The Court said no—officers can still stop drivers when they observe conduct clearly indicating illegal device use. They simply cannot rely on ambiguous behavior alone.
How does this ruling affect criminal cases involving additional charges, like drug possession?
If the stop is unconstitutional, any evidence found afterward may be inadmissible, which can dramatically change the outcome of a case.

The post Maryland Supreme Court: Touching a Phone While Driving Is Not Enough for a Traffic Stop appeared first on Gritz, Hanifin .

Changes to Maryland’s DUI Law – Interlock Requirements as of October 1, 2024

Fri, 09 Jan 2026 17:24:00 GMT

As of October 1, 2024 , Maryland significantly expanded its ignition interlock requirements for individuals charged with or convicted of DUI and DWI offenses. These changes make ignition interlock participation mandatory in situations where it was previously left to judicial discretion.

This update is critical for anyone facing an alcohol‑related driving charge, and understanding the new rules can help prevent additional penalties, license consequences, and costly setbacks.

What Is an Ignition Interlock Device?

An ignition interlock device (IID) is a breathalyzer installed in a vehicle’s ignition system. Before the vehicle can start, the driver must blow into the device. If alcohol is detected—even at a very low level—the car will not start.

IID systems must be:

Professionally installed
Maintained by Maryland MVA‑approved providers
Regularly calibrated and monitored

You can find the list of approved providers through the Maryland MVA website.

What Changed on October 1, 2024?

Before October 1, 2024, individuals who received probation before judgment (PBJ) for a DUI or DWI were not automatically required to participate in the ignition interlock program. Judges could decide on a case‑by‑case basis.

Under the new law— Maryland Transportation Article § 16‑404.1 —the ignition interlock program is now mandatory for:

Anyone convicted of DUI or DWI under Transportation Article § 21‑902(a) or (b)
Anyone who receives PBJ for DUI or DWI
Anyone whose license is suspended due to accumulation of points for an alcohol‑related DUI offense

This aligns with broader policy goals similar to the expansion of “Noah’s Law,” which aimed to reduce repeat DUI offenses across the state.

How Long Do Drivers Need to Use the Interlock Device?

The length of mandatory IID participation depends on prior offenses:

First‑Time DUI Offenders – Minimum of 6 months
Second‑Time Offenders – Minimum of 1 year
Third or Subsequent Offenders – 3 years

Important: The Countdown Doesn’t Start Until Installation Is Reported

The Maryland MVA does not begin crediting time toward your interlock requirement until:

The device is installed, and
You provide proof of installation to the MVA

After the MVA receives proof, the driver is issued an interlock‑restricted license . Failure to abide by the restriction triggers serious consequences.

Penalties for Non‑Compliance

If a driver fails to comply with ignition interlock requirements, they may face:

License suspension
Violation of probation , including potential jail time
Reinstatement of a conviction
Additional monetary penalties

These consequences apply whether the failure involves missed service appointments, blowing above the threshold, or driving a non‑equipped vehicle.

Work‑Vehicle and CDL Considerations

Work‑Vehicle Exemptions

Drivers who must operate employer‑owned vehicles may qualify for restricted work exemptions , depending on the situation.

Commercial Drivers (CDL Holders)

Unfortunately, ignition interlock restrictions are treated as a license suspension for CDL purposes.

This means CDL holders cannot operate commercial vehicles while under an IID restriction—even if the restriction applies only to their personal vehicle.

Why These Changes Matter

Maryland lawmakers expanded the IID requirements to:

Reduce repeat DUI offenses
Increase roadway safety

The MVA’s program already prevents thousands of high BAC vehicle starts each year, according to state records.

If You’re Facing a DUI or DWI, Get Legal Guidance Immediately

These new laws greatly increase the consequences of DUI cases—including mandatory interlock use and severe penalties for mistakes or missed requirements.

An experienced defense attorney can help you:

Contact the Law Offices of Gritz, Hanifin & Shih, LLC today for a free consultation.
Hablamos Español.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Do I have to install an interlock device if I receive PBJ for a DUI?
Yes. As of October 1, 2024, all DUI/DWI PBJ recipients must enter the ignition interlock program.
How long will I need to use the ignition interlock device?
- First offense: 6 months
- Second offense: 1 year
- Third or later: 3 years
When does the required interlock period begin?
The clock starts only after the MVA receives proof of installation .
Can I drive my employer’s vehicle?
In some cases, yes— work‑vehicle exemptions may apply.
Can CDL drivers drive commercial vehicles with an IID restriction?
No. For CDL holders, the restriction counts as a suspension , barring operation of commercial vehicles.
What happens if I violate IID rules?
You may face probation violations, extended IID time, license suspension, or reinstated convictions.

The post Changes to Maryland’s DUI Law – Interlock Requirements as of October 1, 2024 appeared first on Gritz, Hanifin .

Bowens v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Opinion Date: November 25, 2025

Fri, 05 Dec 2025 22:43:00 GMT

Maryland Supreme Court Clarifies Jurisdiction in Underinsured Motorist Claims

Bowens v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
Opinion Date: November 25, 2025
Areas of Law: Personal Injury, Auto Accidents, Insurance Law, Contracts, Civil Procedure

The Supreme Court of Maryland recently issued an important decision affecting underinsured motorist (UIM) claims and where those claims can be filed. In Bowens v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. , the Court clarified how district court jurisdiction is determined when an injured driver seeks UIM benefits after settling with the at‑fault driver’s insurer.

This ruling provides meaningful guidance for accident victims pursuing valid insurance claims—and limits procedural defenses insurers may use to avoid payment.

Background: Auto Accident and Insurance Coverage

George Bowens was injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by another driver, Lisa Daniels. Ms. Daniels’ auto insurance policy provided $30,000 in liability coverage , which was insufficient to fully compensate Mr. Bowens for his injuries.

Mr. Bowens also carried his own insurance policy with State Farm , which included underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage with limits of $50,000 .

After Ms. Daniels’ insurer offered its $30,000 policy limits, Mr. Bowens properly notified State Farm as required by statute. State Farm consented to the settlement and waived its subrogation rights, allowing Mr. Bowens to accept the $30,000 payment.

State Farm Denies the UIM Claim

Once the underlying settlement was completed, Mr. Bowens sought to recover the remaining $20,000 available under his UIM policy. Despite previously consenting to the settlement, State Farm denied the claim .

As a result, Mr. Bowens filed a breach of contract action against State Farm in the District Court for Prince George’s County , seeking $20,000 in UIM benefits.

Lower Courts Dismiss the Case for Lack of Jurisdiction

State Farm moved to dismiss the case, arguing that:

To prevail, Mr. Bowens would need to prove total damages of $50,000 , and
That amount exceeded the District Court’s $30,000 jurisdictional limit .

The District Court agreed and dismissed the case. The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County affirmed the dismissal, reasoning that because total damages exceeded $30,000, the District Court lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction.

Supreme Court of Maryland: Jurisdiction Depends on the Amount Sought

The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed.

Key Holding:

A court’s jurisdiction is determined by the amount the plaintiff seeks from the defendant in the pending action , not by the plaintiff’s total damages or prior settlements received from other insurers.

Because Mr. Bowens sought $20,000 from State Farm , the District Court did have jurisdiction , even though his total damages exceeded $30,000.

The Court reversed the Circuit Court’s judgment and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings.

Why This Decision Matters

This ruling is significant for Maryland accident victims and insurance disputes because it:

Prevents insurers from using jurisdictional technicalities to avoid paying valid UIM claims
Confirms that prior settlements do not control jurisdiction in UIM breach‑of‑contract cases
Makes it easier for injured drivers to pursue smaller UIM claims without being forced into higher courts

In short, insurers cannot block claims simply because total damages exceed the district court limit when the amount actually sought is within that limit .

Injured in an Auto Accident? We Can Help.

Insurance companies often look for procedural defenses to deny or delay valid claims—especially in underinsured motorist cases.

If you were injured in a car accident and are facing resistance from an insurance company, you need an attorney who understands both insurance law and litigation strategy .

Contact Gritz, Hanifin & Shih, LLC today for a free consultation.
We fight to ensure insurance companies honor their obligations.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

What is an underinsured motorist (UIM) claim?

A UIM claim allows an injured driver to recover additional compensation from their own insurance policy when the at‑fault driver’s insurance is insufficient to cover the damages.

Does accepting a settlement from the at‑fault driver prevent a UIM claim?

No. As long as the insured follows statutory notice requirements and obtains the insurer’s consent, a UIM claim may still be pursued.

How is court jurisdiction determined in a UIM case?

According to the Supreme Court of Maryland, jurisdiction is based on the amount sought from the defendant in the lawsuit , not the plaintiff’s total damages or earlier settlements.

Can a district court hear a UIM claim if total damages exceed $30,000?

Yes. If the plaintiff only seeks $30,000 or less from the insurer, the District Court has jurisdiction.

Why did State Farm argue the case should be dismissed?

State Farm argued that proving damages above $30,000 exceeded the District Court’s authority. The Supreme Court rejected that argument.

What should I do if my insurer denies a valid UIM claim?

You should speak with an experienced attorney immediately. Insurance denials often rely on technical defenses that can be challenged in court.

The post Bowens v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Opinion Date: November 25, 2025 appeared first on Gritz, Hanifin .

Reyes v. State Opinion Date: November 25, 2025

Mon, 01 Dec 2025 22:39:00 GMT

Maryland Supreme Court Clarifies When a Sentence Is “Imposed” Under Rule 4‑345

Opinion Date: November 25, 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Maryland
Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Sentencing, Second‑Degree Assault

In a significant sentencing decision, the Supreme Court of Maryland clarified when a criminal sentence is considered “imposed” under Maryland Rule 4‑345 . The Court held that a trial judge may modify or even increase a sentence during an ongoing sentencing hearing , so long as the proceeding has not concluded.

The ruling provides important guidance on sentencing authority, double jeopardy concerns, and the timing of lawful sentence modifications.

Background: Second‑Degree Assault Conviction

A jury convicted the defendant of second‑degree assault . At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge initially announced the following sentence:

One year of incarceration
All but nine months suspended , to be served on home detention
Three years of supervised probation

While the judge was advising the defendant of his post‑trial rights , and before the sentencing hearing had concluded, the prosecutor raised concerns about whether the sentence adequately reflected the court’s intent—particularly regarding the amount of backup incarceration if probation were violated.

Sentence Increased Before Hearing Concluded

After a brief discussion and clarification, the trial judge revised the sentence , increasing it to:

Five years of incarceration
All but nine months suspended , again to be served on home detention
Three years of supervised probation

The revised sentence was imposed before the sentencing hearing ended and while the defendant was still present in court.

Appeal to the Appellate Court of Maryland

The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial judge had illegally increased the sentence after it had already been imposed, in violation of Maryland Rule 4‑345 , which limits a court’s ability to modify sentences once imposed.

The Appellate Court of Maryland rejected this argument, holding that the sentence was not illegally increased because the modification occurred before the sentencing proceeding was complete .

Supreme Court of Maryland: Sentence Not “Imposed” Until Hearing Ends

The case was then reviewed by the Supreme Court of Maryland , which affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision.

Key Holding

The Supreme Court held that under Maryland law:

A sentence is not considered “imposed” for purposes of Rule 4‑345 until the sentencing proceeding has concluded .

As a result:

A trial court retains authority to modify or increase a sentence during an ongoing sentencing hearing
Double jeopardy does not attach until the sentencing proceeding ends
A defendant has no vested expectation of finality while sentencing is still in progress

Because the sentence change occurred before the hearing concluded and while the defendant was present, the modification was lawful.

Why This Decision Matters

This ruling has important implications for criminal defendants and sentencing practice in Maryland:

Judges may correct or revise sentences during the same hearing
Defendants cannot assume a sentence is final until the hearing fully concludes
Rule 4‑345 protections apply only after sentencing is complete

The decision reinforces the importance of having experienced counsel present during sentencing to address potential changes in real time.

Sentencing Is a Critical Stage—Legal Experience Matters

Sentencing is not merely procedural—it can dramatically affect the length and conditions of incarceration, probation, and future consequences.

An experienced criminal defense attorney understands:

How and when sentences may be modified
How Rule 4‑345 operates in practice
When constitutional protections, including double jeopardy, attach

Facing Criminal Charges or Sentencing? We Can Help.

At Gritz, Hanifin & Shih, LLC , we understand every phase of the criminal process—including sentencing. We work diligently to protect our clients’ rights and challenge improper or excessive punishment.

Contact Gritz, Hanifin & Shih, LLC today to discuss your criminal case.
We are committed to protecting your rights and ensuring a fair process.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

The post Reyes v. State Opinion Date: November 25, 2025 appeared first on Gritz, Hanifin .

Goodrich v. State – Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Date: October 24, 2025

Mon, 03 Nov 2025 13:25:00 GMT

Maryland Supreme Court Clarifies When Courts Must Inquire About Self‑Representation

Goodrich v. State
Opinion Date: October 24, 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Maryland
Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In Goodrich v. State , the Supreme Court of Maryland addressed an important constitutional issue: when a trial court is required to conduct further inquiry into a defendant’s right to self‑representation . The Court clarified the obligations of trial judges under Maryland Rule 4‑215 and the Sixth Amendment when a defendant makes ambiguous statements about counsel, self‑representation, or trial delays.

The decision reinforces that while courts must protect a defendant’s constitutional rights, they are not required to conduct repeated inquiries absent a clear and unequivocal request .

Background: Charges and Pretrial Proceedings

Mr. Goodrich was charged in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland with attempted first‑degree murder and related offenses.

Before trial, both the defense and the prosecution jointly requested a postponement of the trial date. The request was based on:

The resignation of Mr. Goodrich’s public defender, and
The need for additional preparation time by new counsel

During this discussion, Mr. Goodrich expressed frustration with remaining incarcerated and stated that he wanted a speedy trial . His new attorney told the court that Mr. Goodrich wanted to represent himself if the trial were postponed. Mr. Goodrich also told the court that he wanted an attorney, but did not want the trial delayed.

The Trial Court’s Decision

The trial court ultimately granted the postponement . After the continuance was granted:

Mr. Goodrich did not request to discharge his attorney
He did not clearly assert a desire to represent himself

At trial, Mr. Goodrich was represented by counsel. A jury convicted him of:

Attempted second‑degree murder
Armed robbery
Use of a firearm in the commission of a felony or crime of violence

Appeal and Appellate Court Ruling

Mr. Goodrich appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to conduct further inquiry into his potential desire for self‑representation.

The Appellate Court of Maryland rejected this argument and affirmed the conviction, holding that:

Mr. Goodrich never clearly and unequivocally requested self‑representation
The trial court provided him ample opportunity to express his wishes

Supreme Court of Maryland: No Error by the Trial Court

The Supreme Court of Maryland granted review to determine whether the trial court violated Mr. Goodrich’s constitutional or procedural rights by not conducting additional hearings on the issue.

Key Holding

The Court held that:

When a court is informed that a defendant might wish to represent himself, the court must conduct a reasonable inquiry to determine whether the defendant is clearly and unequivocally asserting that right
The court must allow the defendant to explain his reasons for discharging counsel, as required by Maryland Rule 4‑215(e)

However, the Court also made clear that:

If the defendant does not clearly express a desire to represent himself or to discharge counsel, the trial court is not required to continue questioning the defendant further.

Because Mr. Goodrich did not renew or clearly assert a request for self‑representation after the continuance was granted, the trial court did not err . The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.

Why This Decision Matters

This ruling provides important guidance for both courts and defendants:

Defendants must clearly and unequivocally assert the right to self‑representation
Courts are not required to infer or guess a defendant’s intent
Trial judges are protected from claims of error when defendants make ambiguous or conditional statements

The decision balances the right to self‑representation with the need for orderly and fair trial proceedings.

Know Your Rights Before Trial

Statements made in frustration—especially regarding delays or incarceration—can have lasting consequences. If you are facing serious criminal charges, it is critical to understand:

Your right to counsel
Your right to self‑representation
The procedural steps required to assert or waive those rights

Facing Serious Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

At Gritz, Hanifin & Shih, LLC , we understand how constitutional rights intersect with real‑world courtroom procedures. We work aggressively to ensure our clients’ rights are protected at every stage of the case.

Call today for a free consultation.
We will help you understand your rights and your options.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

The post Goodrich v. State – Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Date: October 24, 2025 appeared first on Gritz, Hanifin .

Chukwuemeka Mezu v. Kristen Mezu, No. 361, September Term, 2025. Opinion by Graeff, J.

Mon, 03 Nov 2025 13:20:00 GMT

Maryland Appellate Court Warns Attorneys About AI‑Generated Fake Case Citations

Chukwuemeka Mezu v. Kristen Mezu
No. 361, September Term, 2025
Opinion by: Judge Graeff
Court: Appellate Court of Maryland
Areas of Law: Family Law, Legal Ethics, Civil Procedure, Professional Responsibility

In a case of first impression in Maryland, the Appellate Court of Maryland issued a strong warning to attorneys about the misuse of artificial intelligence (AI) in legal research and writing . In Chukwuemeka Mezu v. Kristen Mezu , the Court addressed the growing problem of fictitious case citations generated by AI tools , making clear that attorneys remain fully responsible for verifying the accuracy of all citations submitted to the court.

The opinion serves as a cautionary tale—and a clear ethical directive—for lawyers using AI in their practice.

Background of the Case

The appeal arose from a Motion to Invalidate portions of a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) entered into by Kristen Mezu (“Mother”) and Chukwuemeka Mezu (“Father”) following the filing of a complaint for absolute divorce.

During the appeal, the Mother’s attorney submitted a brief that included numerous case citations generated by artificial intelligence . The brief contained:

Citations to non‑existent (fictitious) cases
Misquoted passages
Citations to cases that did not support the legal propositions for which they were cited

These errors were not minor or isolated; rather, they reflected a fundamental failure to verify the accuracy of the legal authorities relied upon.

How the AI Errors Occurred

The record showed that:

A law clerk prepared the draft brief
The clerk relied heavily on AI‑assisted research tools , including ChatGPT and VLex
She also visited sites such as CourtListener, CaseMine, and Justia
The clerk stated she was unaware that some of these platforms use AI‑generated content or that search results could be the product of AI “hallucinations”

Most importantly, the attorney failed to independently review and verify the AI‑generated citations before filing the brief with the court.

Court’s Response and Ethical Implications

Because of the nature and severity of the misconduct , the Appellate Court of Maryland referred the attorney to the Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission .

The Court emphasized that while AI can be a useful tool, its improper use raises serious ethical concerns . Submitting briefs that contain fake cases—regardless of intent—is unacceptable and undermines the integrity of the judicial process.

Key Rules Cited by the Court

The Court relied on several ethical and procedural rules, including:

Maryland Rule 1‑311(b)

An attorney’s signature on a pleading certifies that:

The attorney has read the document , and
To the best of their knowledge, there is good ground to support it , and
It is not filed for an improper purpose or delay

Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct – Rule 19‑303.1

Attorneys may bring or defend only meritorious claims and contentions .

Submitting fictitious citations—whether generated by AI or otherwise—violates these obligations.

The Court’s Message About AI in Legal Practice

The Appellate Court made an important distinction:

Using AI in legal practice is not inherently improper
Failing to verify AI‑generated content is unquestionably improper

The Court explained that AI tools must be used responsibly , and attorneys cannot rely on the apparent authority or sophistication of AI‑generated output. Courts will not excuse ethical violations simply because technology was involved.

Why This Decision Matters

This opinion serves as:

A warning to attorneys statewide
Guidance for trial courts on how to respond to AI‑related misconduct
A reminder that professional responsibility cannot be outsourced to technology

As AI becomes more common in legal practice, courts will continue to demand accuracy, diligence, and accountability from lawyers.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Using AI in Legal Practice Requires Care and Accountability

The Appellate Court of Maryland issued this decision not to prohibit innovation, but to reinforce that ethical obligations remain unchanged —regardless of the tools used.

Submitting fictitious cases to a court is improper, whether done intentionally or through careless reliance on AI.

The post Chukwuemeka Mezu v. Kristen Mezu, No. 361, September Term, 2025. Opinion by Graeff, J. appeared first on Gritz, Hanifin .

Reckless Driving

Wed, 17 Sep 2025 20:06:00 GMT

Starting October 1, 2025, reckless driving in Maryland will be a jailable offense. If you are charged with reckless driving, you will need the assistance of a Maryland reckless driving lawyer.

What will qualify as Reckless Driving?

Driving 30 mph or more over the posted speed limit
A person can be charged with reckless driving if the police officer thinks that the person is driving in a manner that indicates a wanton or willful disregard for the safety of persons or property or in wanton or willful disregard for the safety of persons or property
- This means that even if a person is driving less than 30 mph over the speed limit, a police officer might still charge you with reckless driving if the speed is considered dangerously high or is combined with other unsafe maneuvers, such as failing to yield the right of way to another person or pedestrian, following too closely, or other traffic violations.
Reckless Driving can also be charged when a person is charged with DUI / DWI

Consequences of a Reckless Driving Charge in Maryland

If you are convicted of reckless driving, you could face:

Up to 60 days in jail
A fine of up to $1,000
6 points placed against your Maryland driving record
Requirement to take a driver improvement class
Having your privilege to drive suspended
Rise in insurance rates
Risk to your employment

What To Do if You’re Charged with Reckless Driving

If you are charged with reckless driving, call the Law Offices of Gritz, Hanifin & Shih, LLC at 301-217-9200 right away.

As reckless driving defense attorneys, we will investigate the charge and work diligently to fight these charges and seek the best outcome for you.

MARYLAND Transportation Article § 21-901.1. Reckless and negligent driving. [Effective October 1, 2025]
(a) A person is guilty of reckless driving if the person drives a motor vehicle:
(1) In wanton or willful disregard for the safety of persons or property;
(2) In a manner that indicates a wanton or willful disregard for the safety of persons or property; or
(3) At a speed at least 30 miles per hour above the posted speed limit.
(b) A person is guilty of negligent driving if the person drives a motor vehicle in a careless or imprudent manner that endangers any property or the life or person of any individual.
(c)
(1) A person convicted of a violation of subsection (a) of this section is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 60 days or a fine not exceeding $1,000 or both.
(2) A person convicted of a violation of subsection (b) of this section is subject to a fine not exceeding $750.

The post Reckless Driving appeared first on Gritz, Hanifin .

Palmer v. State

Thu, 28 Aug 2025 20:01:00 GMT

Maryland Appellate Court Reverses DUI Convictions Where Timing of Alcohol Use Was Unclear

Palmer v. State
Opinion Date: August 28, 2025
Court: Appellate Court of Maryland
Areas of Law: Criminal Law, DUI/DWI, Traffic Offenses

In Palmer v. State , the Appellate Court of Maryland addressed a critical issue in DUI and DWI prosecutions: the State’s burden to prove that alcohol consumption occurred before driving . While the Court upheld some traffic convictions, it reversed DUI‑related convictions due to insufficient evidence regarding when the defendant consumed alcohol.

This case highlights how circumstantial evidence can support some charges—but not others—and reinforces important protections for individuals accused of impaired driving.

Background: Single‑Vehicle Accident Late at Night

Police responded to a single‑vehicle accident at approximately 11:30 p.m. The vehicle had left the roadway, entered a wet, grassy ditch, and struck a speed‑limit sign. A second vehicle was parked nearby, and five to six people were present at the scene when officers arrived.

Officers approached Marconi Palmer, Jr. and observed:

The odor of alcohol on his breath
Bloodshot eyes
Slow and lethargic speech
Wet shoes covered in grass

Mr. Palmer told officers that a tow truck was on the way and stated, “I’m going to pump up my tire and then we can leave.”

Additional observations included:

The vehicle’s hood was warm
A small bottle of whiskey was found near the vehicle
A card bearing Mr. Palmer’s name was located inside the vehicle
The key to the vehicle was found in Mr. Palmer’s pocket

Mr. Palmer was arrested and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) , driving while impaired (DWI) , reckless driving, negligent driving, failure to obey lane directions, and other traffic offenses.

Trial Evidence and Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

At trial, Mr. Palmer’s girlfriend testified that:

She last saw him at 8:00 p.m. , and he had not been drinking at that time
She owned the vehicle involved in the accident
There was only one key to the vehicle

Notably, no police officer could determine when the accident occurred or how long Mr. Palmer had been at the scene before police arrived.

Mr. Palmer moved for judgment of acquittal on all charges based on insufficient evidence. The trial court granted acquittal on some counts but denied the motion on others, including DUI‑related charges.

Appellate Court Decision: Mixed Outcome

Evidence Supported an Inference That Mr. Palmer Was Driving

The Appellate Court held that there was sufficient evidence to infer that Mr. Palmer had been driving the vehicle. The Court relied on:

His wet, grass‑covered shoes
The presence of his personal card inside the vehicle
His statements about repairing the vehicle and leaving
His possession of the only key to the vehicle

The Court also concluded that the nature of the accident supported convictions for negligent driving and failure to obey designated lane directions .

DUI and DWI Convictions Reversed

However, the Court reversed the convictions for driving under the influence and driving while impaired by alcohol .

The key problem:
There was no evidence establishing when Mr. Palmer consumed alcohol.

Because the State could not prove whether alcohol was consumed before or after driving , the evidence was insufficient to support DUI or DWI convictions. The presence of alcohol alone was not enough.

Why This Case Matters in DUI Defense

This decision underscores an important legal principle:

The State must prove not only intoxication—but that intoxication existed at the time of driving .

Even strong circumstantial evidence of drinking may be insufficient if the timeline is unclear. For DUI cases, timing matters .

Know Your Rights When Dealing With Police

If you are stopped or questioned by police following an accident:

Anything you say can and will be used against you
You have the right to remain silent
You are generally required only to provide identification and insurance information

You are not required to explain what happened or answer questions about alcohol use.

Charged With DUI or DWI? We Can Help.

DUI and DWI charges are serious, complex, and highly fact‑specific. Small details—such as the timing of alcohol consumption—can make or break a case.

At Gritz, Hanifin & Shih, LLC , we work every day to protect our clients’ constitutional rights and challenge weak or unsupported charges.

Call 301‑214‑9200 today for a free consultation
We will explain your rights and fight for your right to a fair trial.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Can I be convicted of DUI without proof of when I drank alcohol?

No. As Palmer v. State makes clear, the State must prove that alcohol consumption occurred before or while driving , not afterward.

Is circumstantial evidence enough to prove someone was driving?

Yes. Factors like possession of keys, statements to police, and physical evidence can support an inference that a person was driving.

Why were the DUI and DWI charges reversed in this case?

Because there was no evidence establishing when the accident occurred or whether Mr. Palmer had access to alcohol after driving.

Do I have to answer police questions after an accident?

No. You have the right to remain silent beyond providing basic identification and insurance information.

Can DUI charges be challenged even if alcohol is found at the scene?

Yes. The presence of alcohol alone does not prove impairment at the time of driving.

Should I contact an attorney if I’m charged with DUI or DWI?

Absolutely. Early legal representation is critical in protecting your rights and building a strong defense.

The post Palmer v. State appeared first on Gritz, Hanifin .

Abruquah v. State

Fri, 25 Aug 2023 20:00:00 GMT

Maryland Supreme Court Limits Firearms Identification Testimony in Criminal Cases

Abruquah v. State
Court: Supreme Court of Maryland
Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Evidence, Expert Testimony, Firearms Evidence

In Abruquah v. State , the Supreme Court of Maryland issued a major ruling that significantly limits how prosecutors may use firearms identification evidence in criminal trials. The Court held that expert testimony claiming a specific bullet or cartridge case was fired from a particular gun does not satisfy Maryland’s reliability standards and therefore may not be admitted.

This decision reinforces the courts’ responsibility to closely scrutinize forensic evidence and has far‑reaching implications for gun‑related prosecutions in Maryland.

What the Court Decided

The Supreme Court of Maryland ruled that the prosecution may not call a firearms expert to identify or match a specific bullet or cartridge case to a particular firearm . According to the Court, this type of testimony is not sufficiently reliable under Maryland’s evidentiary standards.

Specifically, the Court held that traditional firearm toolmark identification testimony fails to meet the Daubert/Rochkind standard , which governs the admissibility of expert evidence in Maryland courts.

What Firearms Experts May Still Testify To

The Court did not completely exclude firearms identification testimony. Instead, it drew an important line:

An expert may testify that bullets or cartridge cases are consistent with or inconsistent with having been fired from a particular firearm.

An expert may not testify that a bullet or cartridge case was definitively fired from a specific gun .

In other words, experts can discuss similarities and differences—but they cannot make a conclusive identification tying ammunition to one firearm.

Why the Evidence Was Deemed Unreliable

The Court emphasized that longstanding acceptance of a forensic method is not enough to establish reliability. Under Daubert and Rochkind , courts must do more than rely on tradition or generalized claims of accuracy.

The opinion made clear that:

Courts must seriously scrutinize expert opinions
Reliability cannot be established simply because a method has been used in the past
Impressive‑sounding statistics or studies are insufficient if they do not prove the reliability of the specific testimony being offered

The Court rejected the idea that forensic techniques should be automatically admitted simply because they are widely used or historically accepted.

Why This Ruling Is So Important

This decision has significant consequences for criminal cases involving firearms:

Prosecutors can no longer rely on experts to make absolute gun‑to‑bullet matches
Trial courts must apply heightened scrutiny to forensic evidence
Defendants may have stronger grounds to exclude unreliable expert testimony

The ruling reinforces that scientific reliability—not tradition—controls admissibility in Maryland courts.

Charged in a Case Involving a Firearm? Get Legal Help Immediately

If you or someone you know is accused of a crime involving a gun, this decision could be critical to your defense. Improper or overstated forensic testimony may now be subject to exclusion.

At Gritz, Hanifin & Shih, LLC , we aggressively challenge unreliable evidence and fight to protect our clients’ constitutional rights.

Call 301‑217‑9200 today for a free consultation.
We are experienced, zealous advocates committed to securing the fair trial you deserve.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

What did the Maryland Supreme Court rule in Abruquah v. State?

The Court ruled that firearms experts may not testify that a specific bullet or cartridge case was fired from a particular gun because that testimony is not reliable under Maryland law.

Can firearms experts still testify in criminal cases?

Yes, but only in a limited way. Experts may testify that bullets or cartridge cases are consistent or inconsistent with a firearm—not that they definitively came from that gun.

What standard governs expert testimony in Maryland?

Maryland follows the Daubert/Rochkind standard , which requires courts to evaluate the reliability of expert evidence before it is admitted.

Why isn’t traditional firearms identification automatically admissible?

The Court held that longstanding use or acceptance does not prove scientific reliability. Courts must independently evaluate whether the specific testimony offered is reliable.

How does this ruling affect criminal defendants?

Defendants may now have stronger arguments to exclude overstated or unreliable firearms evidence that previously would have been admitted.

Should I contact a lawyer if my case involves firearms evidence?

Yes. An experienced criminal defense attorney can review the evidence and determine whether expert testimony may be challenged or excluded.

The post Abruquah v. State appeared first on Gritz, Hanifin .

Wooden v. United States, Docket No. 20-5279 Decided March 7, 2022

Thu, 10 Mar 2022 15:57:00 GMT

Supreme Court Decision : https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-5279_09m1.pdf

The Court was asked to decide if a single crime spree counts as multiple “occasions” under Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). In a unanimous 9-0 opinion, the Court rejected that argument and held that William Dale Wooden’s ten burglary offenses arising from a single criminal episode did not occur on different “occasions” and thus count as only one prior conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

The case dates back to 1997, when Mr. Wooden broke into a Georgia storage facility with three friends. After burgling the first unit, they broke through the drywall into the second unit and continued on through a total of ten units. The three were caught and Mr. Wooden pleaded guilty to ten counts of burglary, receiving an eight-year prison sentence, ending the case.

Seventeen years later, a plain clothes police officer looking for a fugitive wanted for misdemeanor theft knocked on Mr. Wooden’s door. He did not identify himself as a police officer. When the officer saw a rifle in his house, Mr. Wooden was arrested for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of state law. These state charges were eventually dropped, however, federal prosecutors decided to prosecute Mr. Wooden who was convicted for violating a federal law barring people with felony convictions from owning firearms. The probation office first recommended a sentence of 21 to 27 months. But the prosecutors argued that Mr. Wooden should be sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, or ACCA, to make his sentence approximately eight times longer.

The ACCA requires judges to impose a minimum sentence of 15 years (with a maximum sentence of life) for people with felony convictions in possession of a gun. The twist in this case is that an individual qualifies for ACCA’s enhancement if they have three prior convictions for violent felonies “committed on occasions different from one another.” Although Mr. Wooden only broke the law on one previous occasion, the 1997 burglary of ten different units at the same location, the prosecutors argued that this crime was actually ten separate “occasions”—one for each unit he broke into. The judge agreed, and rather than a two-year sentence, he gave Wooden a term of nearly 16 years in prison. A federal appeals court affirmed the sentence.

In reversing and remanding the case, the Supreme Court looked at the term “occasions” and unanimously held that even though Mr. Wooden had broken into ten units, it was all on one day at one location and that constituted on “occurrence” under the ACCA.

The post Wooden v. United States, Docket No. 20-5279 Decided March 7, 2022 appeared first on Gritz, Hanifin .

What’s in a Name? What defines a warrant, under the Fourth Amendment?

Fri, 17 Sep 2021 20:36:00 GMT

A Court Order May Satisfy the Warrant Requirement for a Search, According to the Maryland Court of Appeals

The Supreme Court upheld the exclusionary rule and applied it to state courts in 1961. Mapp v.Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The exclusionary rule makes clear that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional and therefore inadmissible in a court of law. While there are exceptions to this rule, generally a warrantless search is illegal, and any evidence found as a result of a warrantless search must be excluded.

A Warrant to Search Does Not Have to be Formally Labeled a “Warrant”

The Maryland Court of Appeals in June, however, held that official authorization of a search
does not have to be called a “warrant” to satisfy the requirement. Whittington v. State, No. 35,
SEPT. TERM, 2020 (Md. June 2, 2021). Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter v.
United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018), the Maryland Court of Appeals noted that a formal label of
an order as a “warrant” has never decided a case. Id at 10. Instead, they made clear that a warrant
must have three things (other than the name warrant) to be constitutionally valid:

A warrant must be issued by a neutral, disinterested magistrate. Lo-ji Sales, Inc. v. New
York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 (1979).
The affiant seeking the warrant must demonstrate to the magistrate probable cause to
believe that “the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction” for
a particular offense. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967).
“Warrants must particularly describe the ‘things to be seized’ ” as well as the place to be
searched. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979).

For Kevin Whittington, the court’s focus on substance rather than form led to his arrest. During
the investigation, law enforcement applied for a court order to GPS track Whittington’s car, and
later applied for a warrant to search his home for controlled substances. Whittington at 3-5.
Following a Supreme Court ruling in 2012 that defined placing GPS tracking on automobiles a
Fourth Amendment “search”, Maryland issued Md. Code, Criminal Procedure §1-203.1 to define
when the court could authorize GPS tracking. That code section, however, defined the court’s
authorization as an “order” rather than as a warrant. Whittington unsuccessfully challenged the
GPS tracking on the grounds that it was formally a court order not a warrant. Id at 11. The court
held that the requirements of §1-203.1 satisfied the warrant requirements because:

The order was issued by a district court or circuit court judge.
The application for the order contained the investigator’s affidavit alleging personal
knowledge of the facts that lead to probable cause,
The application also articulated “with reasonable particularity” the location, person, or
object being tracked.

Probable Cause Inferences Allowed in a Warrant Application
The Court of Appeals also rejected Whittington’s argument that the judge issuing the warrant to
search his home did not have a substantial basis for finding probable cause. The substantial basis
test is a review by an appellate court of whether the magistrate properly found there was
probable cause. The appellate court will not review all the facts according to their own
judgement of probable cause, but rather whether the judge originally granting the warrant
application had a substantial basis to find there was probable cause. Id at 13.
The Court in Whittington, at 13-14, found that probable cause in the application for a warrant to
search a home:

Does not require direct evidence that the evidence sought would be found in the place
searched. Stevenson v. State, 455 Md. 709, 724 (2017).
May be inferred from the type of crime, the nature of the items sought, the opportunity
for concealment, and reasonable inferences about where the defendant may hide the
incriminating items.” Holmes v. State, 368 Md. 506, 522 (2002).
May be predicated on an affiant’s professional experience and inferences drawn
therefrom in deciding whether probable cause exists. Moats v. State, 455 Md. 682, 700-
701 (2017).
Must be able to reasonably infer a logical connection, or “nexus” that ties police
observations, contained within the four corners of the court order application, to the
defendant’s home. Holmes, at 521.

How to Exclude if You Think You’ve Been Subject to a Warrantless Search

If your home, your car, or your person has been GPS tracked or searched by other means, your
Fourth Amendment rights may have been violated. It is important that you consult a criminal
defense attorney as soon as possible and ask them to review the facts of your case. You may
have a basis to exclude any evidence seized during an unlawful search. The attorneys at Gritz,
Hanifin, and Shih LLC are experienced and zealous representatives when it comes to protecting
your rights and fighting for the fair trial you deserve.

The post What’s in a Name? What defines a warrant, under the Fourth Amendment? appeared first on Gritz, Hanifin .

Update To Maryland’s Uninsured Motorist Statute

Wed, 29 Jul 2020 18:11:00 GMT

Desiree Berry and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and State Farm
Fire and Casualty Co. v. Andrae Queen, and others similarly situated., Misc. No. 10,
September Term, 2019; Maryland Insurance Administration v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., No. 63, September Term, 2019

https://www.courts.state.md.us/data/opinions/coa/2020/10a19m.pdf

The Maryland Court of Appeals recently clarified that damage to one’s property (vehicle) includes reimbursement for rental coverage when a person is making an uninsured motorist claim. An uninsured motorist claim is when a person is in an accident with someone who does not have insurance. The injured person is able to make a claim for money from their own insurance carrier. The holding states that “…the phrase “damage to property”—as incorporated by Maryland’s Uninsured Motorist Statute—includes loss of use damages such as rental costs.

This is an important case regarding the interpretation of property damage. This decision will help innocent victims who are injured by uninsured drivers and allow them to collect the money they deserve. If you are involved in an automobile collision, it is important that you immediately consult with an automobile attorney to have someone to fully protect your rights. Gritz, Hanifin, & Shih, LLC represent motorists injured in accidents to fight for the money they deserve.

The post Update To Maryland’s Uninsured Motorist Statute appeared first on Gritz, Hanifin .

Richard W. Williams v. State of Maryland

Thu, 18 Jun 2020 21:01:00 GMT

Maryland Court of Special Appeals Holds that Tackling a Suspect after a Traffic Stop Resulted in an Illegal Arrest and Ruled that Evidence Should be Suppressed

Richard W. Williams v. State of Maryland, No. 858, September Term, 2019

View arguments here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gsKJVK7J2eA

From Case Headnotes:
CRIMINAL LAW–FOURTH AMENDMENT –TERRY FRISK
State violated criminal defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights when police officer performed a take down without testifying that defendant was armed and dangerous, at risk of flight, or a threat to the officer’s safety.

CRIMINAL LAW–FOURTH AMENDMENT –ARREST
Defendant was placed under arrest when he was tackled, wrestled to the ground, told to put his hands behind his back, and pepper sprayed. The arrest was not supported by probable cause because there was no evidence to warrant a prudent person in believing that the defendant had committed or was committing a criminal offense at the time of the arrest, and evidence gathered after the unlawful arrest should have been suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree.

CRIMINAL LAW–RESISTING ARREST
Evidence was insufficient to convict criminal defendant of resisting arrest where arrest was unlawful.

The legal system and criminal defense lawyers are a major check on police abuse of powers. The day after the nation was dealing with the aftermath of the death of George Floyd, the Minnesota man who died during an arrest for a minor criminal offense, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals condemned a police officer’s physical take-down of a Pocomoke City man suspected of a minor traffic violation. Williams v. State, No. 858, Sept. Term 2019 (May 29, 2020). While the timing of the unreported ruling is obviously coincidental, it serves as a reminder that the limits on the State’s use of force during a routine arrest have been, and will continue to be, a significant issue for law enforcement, the communities they serve, and ultimately, the courts.

Richard Williams was pulled over by a police officer in Pocomoke City, Maryland, for talking on his cell phone while driving, which is a non incarcerable traffic ticket. After Mr. Williams stopped his car, both he and Sergeant Brown got out of their vehicles. Williams quickly exited his vehicle with his back to the officer, clutching something in his hands. Sergeant Brown approached Mr. Williams quickly from behind and took him down to the ground, pepper sprayed him and handcuffed him. While Mr. Williams was handcuffed, Sergeant Brown searched him and discovered three baggies of marijuana totaling less than 10 grams (which is a civil citation and not a criminal amount) as well as $443 in cash on and about Mr. Williams. Sergeant Brown then searched his car and found a scale and a criminal amount of marijuana as well as baggies that were alleged to have been for packaging Marijuana.
Williams was charged and convicted of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possession of marijuana, resisting arrest, and driving on a suspended license.
The Court reversed the convictions for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possession of marijuana, and resisting arrest; holding that Mr. Williams’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an illegal arrest and search and that the evidence could not support his conviction for resisting arrest.
Before trial, Williams sought to suppress the items found in the car. His main argument was that the unjustified use of force by the officer transformed a routine traffic stop into a warrantless arrest without probable cause, making the evidence found in the car the tainted fruits of an illegal arrest, and therefore inadmissable. The circuit court disagreed with Williams and let the evidence in; the Court of Special Appeals did not and over ruled the circuit court.

The State’s first argument was that the take-down was a reasonable effort to engage in what is known as a Terry frisk for officer safety under the Supreme Court case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17773604035873288886&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr

The Terry case carved out a limited exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement that permits an officer to conduct a pat-down for weapons if there is “a reasonable articulable suspicion” that the suspect is “armed and dangerous.” The Court of Special Appeals rejected this argument, noting that although the officer testified that Williams got out of the car quickly with his back turned and something in his hands, the officer never explained to the trial court why he thought this might indicate that Williams was engaged in criminal activity or posed a threat to officer safety. The Terry exception, therefore, was unavailable on these facts.

The State’s second argument was that the arrest gave rise to the possibility that that car would be towed and later inventoried so that the discovery of the contraband was inevitable. This argument was also rejected. Seizure of a vehicle and a subsequent inventory search cannot be done without a lawful arrest. For a warrantless arrest to be lawful, the appeals court explained, the officer must have sufficient knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information to justify a belief that the suspect had committed or was committing a crime. All that the officer had in this case was a traffic stop and a suspect’s quick exit with his back turned while clutching an unknown object. The Court concluded that “On that record, no objectively reasonable police officer would have had cause to believe that Mr. Williams had committed or was committing a crime.” Since this was an unlawful arrest, everything that followed, including the discovery of the contraband or its alleged “inevitable” discovery during a possible inventory of the vehicle was, or would have been, unlawful. The Court of special Appeals therefore ruled that the evidence seized as a consequence of the unlawful arrest should have been suppressed at trial, requiring reversal of the drug-related offenses.

Since the crime of resisting arrest also requires proof that the attempted arrest was itself lawful, Williams’ conviction for that offense was also reversed. His conviction for driving on a suspended license was affirmed without discussion, presumably because the traffic stop itself was lawful, and the discovery of the suspended license was indeed inevitable.

The Court addressed a number of other issues in its opinion, including when the discovery of a non-criminal amount of marijuana on a suspect’s person might justify the search of a car. The Court unfortunately did not address the quick and violent nature of this police-civilian encounter other than saying that it was an arrest without probable cause. If the problems that we are seeing in the news today about policing practices are to be stopped, perhaps the Courts need to use stronger words admonishing this unconstitutional behavior.

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Maryland State Bar Association Message

Tue, 26 May 2020 18:34:00 GMT

Here is a recent message from the Maryland State Bar Association from Friday, May 22, 2020, regarding the planned reopening of the Courts.

As we turn to the holiday weekend, we bring you important updates from the Judiciary about the phased reopening of the courts, as well as Judiciary responses to recent MSBA inquiries on behalf of the profession. We will provide more detailed analysis and commentary on the impact of these orders in the coming days and weeks.

Four New Administrative Orders from the Judiciary

Here are summaries from the Court about four new Administrative Orders:

1) Administrative Order on the Progressive Resumption of Full Function of Judiciary Operations . The administrative order outlines operational directives to the courts across the state as the judicial branch continues to monitor the COVID-19 public health emergency.

Beginning June 5, at 5 p.m., the Maryland courts will reopen through a phased approach. There are five phases and the Maryland Judiciary is currently in Phase 1 . Each phase will represent an increase in the level of activity within each courthouse and court office. Depending on the current state of COVID-19 throughout Maryland, it may be necessary for a court and/or jurisdiction to adjust phases. Regardless of the phase, the administrative order encourages the courts to continue using technology for remote proceedings, either through video or telephonic purposes, as outlined in the Amended Administrative Order on Remote Proceedings Held During the COVID -19 Emergency issued May 1.

The Judiciary also issued three other administrative orders regarding jury trials and grand juries, the tolling or suspension of statutes of limitations and statutory and rules deadlines related to the initiation of matters and pending matters, as well as the suspension of foreclosures, evictions, and other ejectments for residences.

2) The Administrative Order Lifting the Statewide Suspension of Jury Trials and Resuming Grand Juries states, in part, that grand juries may resume at the discretion of an administrative judge and new grand juries may be empaneled, as necessary. Additionally, grand juries that are currently convened may be extended by the administrative judge. All jury trials, both civil and criminal, will resume and trial dates will be scheduled beginning October 5, 2020. Priority will be given to criminal trials and other urgent court matters, such as family law emergencies. Any jury trial previously scheduled between October 5, 2020, and December 31, 2020, will remain, unless otherwise ordered by the court’s administrative judge. Read the full order for more details.

3) The Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadline in Pending Matters states, in part, that the number of days that the courts were closed to the public does not count against the time remaining for the initiation of a court matter. Filing deadlines to initiate matters will be extended by an additional 15 days, depending on the date in which a specific clerk’s office opens. For example, if two days remained for the filing of a new matter on March 15, 2020, then two days would remain upon the reopening of the courts to the public on July 20, 2020. With the additional fifteen days, seventeen days would be left for a timely filing beginning July 20, 2020. Additionally, all statutes and rules deadlines related to pending court proceedings are tolled or suspended by the number of days that the courts are closed to the public. As such, the number of days the courts were closed to the public do not count against the time remaining to conduct judicial proceedings. Read the full order for more details.

4) The Administrative Order on Suspension during the COVID -19 Emergency of Foreclosures, Evictions, and Other Ejectments involving Residences states, in part, that the stay on residential foreclosures and evictions will be lifted effective July 25, 2020.

MSBA Continues to Share Reopening Questions With the Judiciary on Behalf of the Profession

We also invite you to review the Judiciary’s responses to recent questions we posed on behalf of our members and partners about reopening considerations, remote technologies, and filing considerations. We are thankful to have shared nearly 200 questions on behalf of the profession during this difficult time.

The post Maryland State Bar Association Message appeared first on Gritz, Hanifin.

Your Constitutional Rights in a Criminal Jury Trial

Fri, 24 Apr 2020 13:29:00 GMT

Ramos v. Louisiana

On April 20, 2020, the United States Supreme Court handed down a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Neil Gorsuch that requires state juries to be unanimous to convict defendants in criminal jury trials. The court’s 6-3 ruling overturned its 1972 decision in Apodaca v. Oregon .

Before this ruling, only Louisiana and Oregon allowed for 10-2 verdicts. Now they must join the remaining 48 States, including Maryland, that require unanimous jury verdicts. This Ruling holds that the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution shall apply in the same way to the states as it does the federal government. Most of our Constitutional rights were already incorporated and applied to the states, however the Supreme Court had long allowed this protection to be decided on a state-by-state basis.

This complicated decision by Justice Gorsuch was joined in part by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor with Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Clarence Thomas writing concurring opinions. Justice Samuel Alito dissented and was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and in part by Justice Elena Kagan. In his dissent, Justice Alito opined that the decision not only overruled precedent but “imposes a potentially crushing burden on the courts and criminal justice systems of those States.” Fortunately for criminal defendants, their right to a fair trial won out.

Here at Gritz, Hanifin, & Shih, LLC we work hard every day to protect your constitutional rights. It is important when you are hiring an attorney that you understand your rights and how they will affect your case. A criminal jury trial is a complicated and serious occurrence and should be handled as such. Call today at 301-217-9200 to discuss your rights and your right to a fair trial.

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